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the failure to file them with the notice of motion is not a
jurisdictional defect vulnerable in a certiorari review. (Imperial Beverage Co. v. Su.pe1·ior Co1(rt, 24 Cal.2d 627 [150
P.2d 881].)
The order vacating the decree is affirmed.
Gibson, C..J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
Edmonds, J., concurred m the judgment.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 3,
1952.

[L. A. No. 22103.

In Bank.
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AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (a Corporation),
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION, LEO V. NOWAK et al., Respondents.
[la, lb] Workmen's Compensation-Liens on Award.-A lien for
unemployment disability payments made to an applicant for
workmen's compensation must be allowed against a lump sum
payable under a compromise agreement between him and the
compensation insurance carrier, since such compromise payment comes within the definitions of "compensation" as enunciated in Lab. Code, §§ 3207, 5001.
[2] Id.-Liens on Award.-In determining whether lien for unemployment disability payments should be made against amount
awarded applicant for workmen's compensation as result of a
compromise, the "\Vorkmen's Compensation Law and Unemployment Insurance Act should not be construed together in a
manner which would defeat the legislative intent to avoid
overlapping or duplicating payments, and which also would
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act where there is a question whether benefits are payable under the compensation law.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying· claim of lien against amount payable
as compensation under a compromise. Order annulled.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Workmen's Compensation, § 197.
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Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Sherman Welpton, Jr., Herlihy
& Herlihy and M. A. Cornell, Jr., for Petitioner.
Sidney L. Weinstock as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger and Thomas L.
Higbee for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Aetna Life Insurance Company seeks review of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission which
denies Aetna's claim of lien against $2,400 payable to Leo
V. Nowak, an employe of Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, under a compromise agreement between the employe
and American Motorists Insurance Company, the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier of Vultee.
Petitioner contends, in effect, that the Industrial Accident
Commission has failed in this case to give effect to t~e legislative intention, declared in the Workmen's Compensation
Act (Lab. Code, § 4903, par. (f)) and the Unemployment
Insurance Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, § 207)
and emphasized by this court in Bryant v. Industrial Ace.
Com. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32], that a disabled
workman is not entitled to unemployment compensation disability benefits for a period of unemployment caused by a
disability for which he is entitled to workmen's compensation.
The record sustains this contention and the order of the
commission must be annulled.
It was held in the Bryant case that, to make the declared
intent effective, the Industrial Accident Commission, pursuant
to paragraph (f) of section 4903 of the Labor Code, must
allow a lien "against any amount to be paid as [workmen's]
compensation'' for the ''amount of unemployment compensation disability benefits which have been paid under or pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act in those cases
where, pending a determination under [the workmen's compensation law] . . ., there was uncertainty whether such
benefits were payable under that act or payable [under the
workmen's compensation law].''
[la] In the present case the Industrial Accident Commission contends that the lien cannot or should not attach to
the amount payable under the compromise because that sum
is not an "amount to be paid as [workmen's] compensation."
This contention is untenable. The compromise payment comes
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within the definitions of ''compensation'' as enunciated in
sections 3207 and 5001 of the Labor Code. (See footnotes
2 and 3, infra, p. 604.) To sustain the contention would not
only derog·ate the statute but would permit the Industrial
Accident Commission to adopt and effectuate a policy sharply
contrary to that which has been clearly declared by the
Legislature and which has been expressly upheld by this
court. (Bryant v. lnd7drial Ace. Com. (1951), supra, 37 Cal.
2d 215.)
The history of this proceeding is as follows: Nowak, the
employe, was unable to work for several months because of
a disabled back. He claimed that his disability was the result
of an industrial injury and filed his application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Accident Commission.
American Motorists Insurance Company, the workmen's compensation insurance carrier, denied liability.
Aetna, during the period in question, was the insurer of
Vultee, the employer, under a voluntary plan for the payment of unemployment compensation disability benefits and
other benefits, including medical expenses, where an employe
became unable to work because of a nonindustrial injury.
This plan was adopted pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d, art. 10, pt.
6). Aetna paid $1,256.05 unemployment disability benefits,
other benefits which were used for living expenses, and medical expenses. It filed its claim of lien for the amount of
these payments with the Industrial Accident Commission
in the proceeding brought by Nowak against American Motorists Insurance Company. On this claim Nowak endorsed
the following: ''I consent to the requested allowance of a lien
against my compensation.''
Nowak and American Motorists negotiated a compromise
of their controversy as to whether Nowak was entitled to
workmen's compensation. Their agreement recites, as the
reason for compromise, that ''grave dispute exists as to whether
there was an injury arising out of and in course of the employment, and if so, whether said injury resulted in the
condition of which applicant complains. There is also dispute as to whether there is resultant permanent disability.
The parties seek to avoid the hazards of further litigation."
They ''agree to settle any and all claims on account of said
injury by the payment of . . . $2,400.00 . . . in one lump
sum, less attorney's fees as set by the Commission." The
compromise agreement does not mention Aetna's claim of lien.
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Shortly after the compromise was presented to the Industrial .Accident Commission for approval, the employe's
attorney wrote to the Industrial Accident Commission stating
that the employe and the workmen's compensation insurance
carrier ''contemplated that the lien of Aetna Life Ins. Co.
would not be observed. For that reason, the reason for the
Compromise and Release was specifically framed so that it
went only to resolvement of the issue of injury and to the
issue of permanent disability"; that "Aetna has merely paid
what is its true share considering the fact that applicant's
condition may have been wholly or partially non-industrial."
A copy of this letter was sent to Aetna. Aetna then wrote
to the Industrial Accident Commission stating, "We believe
that the only reason for the proposed compromise is an effort
on the part of the applicant to retain the $1,200 admittedly
paid to him by the Aetna Life Insurance Company and an
effort on the defendant's part to help him retain it, thereby
saving them the payment of an equal amount in order to
effect compromise. The issue of the Aetna Life Insurance
Company's lien is before the commission and we do not believe the applicant and the defendant have a legal right to in
effect destroy our statutory lien by agreement simply by stating that the compromise does not intend to dispose of certain
issues.'' Aetna's letter requested a further hearing. Such
hearing was had. Aetna established that it had paid $1,256.05
in medical expenses and weekly payments which the employe
used for living expenses and that its policy did not cover
industrial injuries.
At that hearing (and in its petition for rehearing) Aetna
directed the referee's attention to the opinion of the District
Court of Appeal in Bryant v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1950),
reported at (Cal.App.) 224 P.2d 444. This is the Bryant
case in which we granted a hearing and the final opinion in
which is reported at 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32]. While the
Bryant case was pending in this court the Industrial .Accident
Commission made the order here attacked; it approved the
compromise and ordered that Aetna's claimed lien be denied
and that Aetna be dismissed from the proceeding.
The Industrial .Accident Commission takes the position
that an essential basis for application of paragraph (f) of
section 4903 of the Labor Code and the principles enunciated
in the Bryant case is the determination by that commission
that the disabling injury was sustained in circumstances which
entitle the disabled employe to workmen's compensation dur-
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ing a period for which he has received unemployment compensation disability benefits, and that, for the benefit of the
injured workman, it can leave open the question whether his
injury was industrial, and that a person in the position of
Aetna, who has advanced disability payments prior to determination of the issue, has no right to have the issue determined. The commission says that under general Industrial
Accident Commission policy and specific rule 1 it would not
leave open the question of the industrial character of the
injury and would not approve a compromise such as the one
here unless there was doubt that the workman could establish
that he was entitled to workmen's compensation. In support
of this argument the Industrial Accident Commission refers
to evidence, received at an intermediate hearing before it,
which tends to show that the workman's disability had no
connection with his employment. If the question had been
litigated, it says, the workman might well have been awarded
nothing and Aetna would then have received nothing because
there would have been neither a right to reimbursement nor a
fund upon which to claim a lien. However, in that event, the
issue in which Aetna is interested would have been both heard
and determined.
Aetna urges that the Industrial Accident Commission should
be required to decide whether the injury was industrial, because the procedure adopted here-refusal to determine the
issue and dismissal of Aetna-is tantamount to refusal to
hear and could result in the perpetration of a fraud on it as
a result of collusion between the employe and the workmen's
compensation insurance carrier, the perpetration of which
would be aided by such procedure of the Industrial Accident
Commission. Furthermore, Aetna asserts, if the procedure
here followed by the commission is upheld, carriers such as
Aetna inevitably will refuse to pay claimed unemployment
compensation disability benefits promptly and, necessarily
for the proper handling of their business under those circumstances, will await final decision by the Industrial Accident
Commission as to whether the injury is industrial. There is
merit in both contentions. Without even considering the
1
8ection 10890, title 8, of the California Administrative Code reads,
''Agreements which provide for the payment of less than the full amount
of compensation due or to become due, and which undertake to release
the employer from all future liability, will be approved only where it
appears that a reasonable doubt exists as to the rights of the parties
or that approval would be for the best interest of the parties.''
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basic legal implications of the first, the latter contention is
impelling.
[2] Obviously it is to the benefit of disabled workmen and
in full accord with the salutary public policy of the relevant
statutes that such workmen receive prompt payment pending
determination of the cause of their disability. The Workmen's Compensation Law and the Unemployment Insurance
Act should not "be construed together in a manner which not
only would defeat directly one legislative intent (to avoid
overlapping or duplicating payments) but which also would
tend to defeat a substantial purpose by discouraging the
prompt payment of benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act where there is a question whether benefits are
payable under the compensation law. To the contrary see
section 3202 of the Labor Code : The provisions of the Workmen 's Compensation Law "shall be liberally construed by
the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for
the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.'' And, as this court pointed out in California Emp.
Com. v. Los Angeles Etc. News Corp. (1944), 24 Cal.2d 421,
427 [150 P.2d 186], the Unemployment Insurance Act "is a
remedial statute and as such must be liberally construed for
the purpose of accomplishing its objects."
[lb] As stated above, there is no merit to the contention
of the Industrial Accident Commission that the amount to
be pa.id under the compromise agreement is not "compensation." The payment clearly comes within the general definition of "compensation" in the Workmen's Compensation Law 2
and the definition thereof in the chapter of that law which
concerns compromise and release. 3
Both parties have cited Hawthorn v. Industrial Ace. Com.
(1951), 101 Cal.App.2d 568, 572 [225 P.2d 966]. That case,
however, is not determinative of the issue in the present case.
Hawthorn, a city fireman and a member of the State Employees' Retirement System, was injured in line of duty.
Under special provisions of the Labor Code which apply to
"Section 3207 of the Labor Code provides, " 'Compensation' means
compensation under Division IV [the Workmen's Compensation Law]
and includes every benefit or payment conferred by Division IV upon an
injured employee, or in the event of his death, upon his dependents,
without regard to negligence.''
"Section 5001 of the Labor Code provides, ''Compensation is the
measure of the responsibility which the employer has assumed for injuries or deaths which occur to employees in his employment when subject to this division. No release of liability or compromise agreement
is valid unless it is approved by the commission.''
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firemen so injured (div. IV, pt. 2, ch. 2, art. 7) Hawthorn
was entitled to leave of absence without loss of salary in lieu
of temporary disability workmen's compensation (Lab. Code,
§ 4850), and the Industrial Accident Commission was required, at the request of the city or the retirement system,
to determine whether the disability was incurred in line of
duty (Lab. Code, § 4851). The only holding of the Hawthorn
case is that the commission had neither duty nor power to
award leave of absence and salary. Its closest approach to
relevancy here lies in the suggestion that the commission's
"only responsibility is to determine upon request whether
the djsability claimed arose out of and in the course of the
employment." In that case, however, the city and the retirement system, which could require the commission to determine whether the :fireman's disability arose out of and in
the course of employment, were not parties in interest claiming
a lien as is Aetna, the one who is entitled to require the
commission to make a similar determination as to the employe
here.
'\Ve conclude that if the parties, including Aetna, cannot
work out an agreement which effects a settlement of Aetna's
claim, then the Industrial Accident Commission should determine the period of disability for which the employe is
entitled to compensation and allow the claimed lien for the
amounts of unemployment disability benefits paid during that
period.
For the reasons above stated, the order is annulled and
the cause is remanded to the Industrial Accident Commission
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
Gibson, C..J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CAR'rER, .T.-I dissent.
I reaffirm the views expressed in my dissent in Bryant v.
Industria[ Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215, 223 [231 P.2d 32].
There are features about this case, however, which necessitate additional discussion.
The majority holds that a lien for unemployment disability
payments made to an applicant for workmen's compensation
must be allowed against a lump sum award made as the result of a compromise.
The Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226,
as amended, § 207) provides that a person shall be entitled to

606

AETNA LIFE INs. Co. v. IND. Ace. CoM.

[38 C.2d

disability payments thereunder unless he has received or is
entdled to receive compensation under the workmen's compensation laws. In the instant case there has never been a
showing that Nowak, the employe, was entitled to compensation. He received a lump sum by way of a compromise agreement between him and his employer's insurance carrier. To
reach the result that such sum is compensation, and thus
subject to a lien for disability payments, the majority reasons
that if the lien is not allowed, the insurer covering the liability
for disability payments will not make them promptly but
will withhold them to see if workmen's compensation is
awarded, and, therefore, the liberal application of the workmen's compensation laws would thus be thwarted. There can
be no doubt that petitioner was required by law to make the
disability payments whether or not an award of workmen's
compensation was made in the applicant's favor. It is strange
reasoning indeed which supposes a ''probable'' failure to
comply with the law as a reason for interpreting a statute
favorable to the prospective law violator. The presumption
is to the contrary. A person is presumed to be innocent of
wrong and that the law has been and will be obeyed. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1963 [ 1, 33].) Hence, we will not suppose that the
requirement that disability payments be made will be wilfully
disobeyed.
This is the first case which has come to my attention in
which the author of the majority opinion has relied upon
section 3202 of the Labor Code as a basis for the interpretation of the provisions of that code or the workmen's compensation law, and then such reliance is for the purpose of
denying the benefits of the law to persons injured in the
course of their employment. This is indeed using the mandate
of liberal construction for its own destruction. A definition
of liberal construction may be found in my dissenting opinion
in Caliform·a Shipb1tilding Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 31
Cal.2d 270, 288, 289 [188 P.2d 27].
There is another factor of compelling importance. The
effect of the majority's interpretation is that there must be a
determination of whether compensation is payable in every
case, and, therefore, the provision for compromising compensation claims becomes ineffective, and might just as well
be stricken from the statute. There can be no compromise,
because, if it must be decided whether the injury is compensable in all cases, and hence a lien attaches, there is nothing
to compromise. The statute says that nothing therein (and

1

1

1
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that includes the allowance of a lien for disability payments)
shall prevent a compromise. It reads: "No contract, rule,
or regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for
the compensation fixed by this division, but nothing in this
division shall: (a) . . . Impair the right of the parties interested to compromise, subject to the provisions herein contained, any liability which is claimed to exist under this division on account of injury or death." (Italics added.) (Lab.
Code, § 5000.) "Compensation is the measure of the responsibility which the employer has assumed for injuries or
deaths which occur to employees in his employment when
subject to this division. No release of liability or compromise
agreement is valid unless it provides for the payment of full
compensation in accordance with this division or unless approved by the commission." (Lab. Code, § 5001.) If when
a lien is filed against a compromise award the commission
must decide whether the injury is compensable, the extent
of the disability and the amount of compensation, the compromise is nullified because it is based on a dispute as to
those factors. It is clear, therefore, that the right to compromise is not only impaired in direct violation by section 5000,
it is completely destroyed.
Even conceding the soundness of the majority holding in
the Bryant case, which I do not, it should not be extended
to a case such as this where the only award made in favor of
the injured employee is by way of a compromise on the issue
of liability. This should be apparent when we consider the
desirability from the standpoint of the injured employee of
compromising cases of doubtful liability. Such cases, if not
compromised, are generally taken into court which results
in delay and expense to both parties, and often the defeat of
applicant's claim. The Legislature, therefore, wisely provided for a compromise, believing it to be to the best interests
of the applicant in doubtful cases of liability. In fact a
compromise is often reached where the agreement expressly
provides that it does not constitute an admission of liability
by the defendant-employer. Generally, in such cases the applicant agrees to accept much less than the amount of his
claim. Such being the case it is apparent that if a lien is
permitted for unemployment disability payments against the
amount agreed upon by way of compromise, the incentive
to compromise will be greatly minimized and many injured
employees will be deprived of the benefits of this remedial
statute enacted for their protection. If, as the majority says,

1
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1
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1
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1
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the Unemployment Insurance .Act and the Workmen's Compensation .Act should be construed together as remedial
statutes, and as such, must be liberally construed for the
purpose of accomplishing their objects, it seems clear that
such a construction of the two acts would lead to a holding
that the lien provision of the former act would not apply to
an award based upon a compromise of liability for the injury
for which disability payments were made. Considerations of
public policy should dictate that it is of far greater importance,
particularly in advaneing the social and economic welfare of
injured workingmen, to compromise and settle disputed claims
for workmen's compensation, than to permit a few carriers of
unemployment disability insurance to recoup their unemployment disability payments from the amount of an award
based upon a compromise and thus destroy the incentive to
compromise such claimfl.
Finally, it should be pointed out that even if the majority's
interpretation is correct, the claimant of the lien for disability payments had the burden of establishing the validity
of its lien which necessarily required it to establish that
Nowak's injury was compensable, the extent of the disability
and the amount of compensation payable. That is true because it is not entitled to the lien unless the award was payable
under the workmen's compensation laws. It has failed to
meet this burden, as it offered no evidence on the subject.
I would, therefore, affirm the order of the commission denying petitioner's lien.
Respondent's (I..A.C.) petition for a rehearing was denied
.April 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

